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III. INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT REMITTANCES AND THEIR ROLE IN DEVELOPMENTIntroduction
Migrant remittances are a steadily growing external source of capital for developing
countries. While foreign direct investments and capital market flows fell sharply in the last
years due to the recession in the high income countries, migrant remittances continued to
grow, reaching USD 149.4 billion in 2002. The importance of remittances in compensating
the human capital loss of developing countries through migration and their potential in
boosting economic growth was already recognised in the beginning of the 1980s. A wide
range of issues related to remittances became the subject of political debate, as well as of
more in-depth research. These topics include the determinants of remittances, the transfer
channels used and their economic impact on the remittance receiving countries. Over the
past years, partly because of the sharp increase in remittance flows, the research on these
issues gained momentum, resulting in a mushrooming of scientific literature.
This introduction presents a critical overview of the state-of-art literature on
remittances and is organised as follows: in the following section, the data on migrant
remittances, methods of estimating the amounts of remittance flows, global and regional
trends in remittance flows, and their importance as a source of capital for developing
countries, are discussed. The third section gives an overview of the theoretical and
empirical research on the determinants of remittances and the following section outlines
the transfer channels, the cost involved with international money transfers and the
evolutions of money transfer markets. The last two sections examine the literature on the
effects of remittances on inequality, growth and the balance of payments, and present the
conclusions.
1. Migrant remittances: data and trends
Data sources and evaluation of remittance flows
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) interpretation, remittances are
recorded in three different sections of the balance of payments:
● Compensations of employees are the gross earnings of workers residing abroad for less
than 12 months, including the value of in-kind benefits (in the current account,
subcategory “income”, item code 2310).
● Workers’ remittances are the value of monetary transfers sent home from workers
residing abroad for more than one year (in the current account, subcategory “current
transfers”, item code 2391).
● Migrants’ transfers represent the net wealth of migrants who move from one country of
employment to another (in the capital account, subcategory “capital transfers”, item
code 2431).
While the IMF categories are well defined, there are several problems associated with their
implementation worldwide that can affect their comparability. Some central banks
(e.g. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) book almost all migrants’ remittances under “compensationINTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI 2006 EDITION – ISBN 92-64-03627-X – © OECD 2006140
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banks (e.g. the Czech National Bank and the Bulgarian National Bank) do not record
workers’ remittances separately, but pull them together with other private transfers under
“other current transfers other sectors” (item code 2392).2 However, for the Czech National
Bank, under “other current transfers other sectors”mainly household transfers are
recorded (Czech National Bank, 2002). In addition, many central banks do not separately
record “migrants’ transfers” in the capital account.
In order to capture the extent of migrant remittances in a better way than the data
reported under the heading of “workers’ remittances” alone, scholars use different
calculation methods. Some calculate them as the sum of three components: 1) compensation
of employees, 2) workers’ remittances, and 3) migrants’ transfers (Ratha, 2003). Others sum up
just compensation of employees and workers’ remittances (Taylor, 1999). And finally, Daianu
(2001) proposes for the computation of remittance credits the sum of “compensation of
employees”, “workers’ remittances”, and “other current transfers of other sectors”.
Daianu’s method of estimating international migrants’ remittances flows is considered to
be the most appropriate to overcome the discrepancies referred to above. All data
presented in this section are calculated using this method. However, the data have serious
limitations and the estimates should be interpreted with caution. In some ways, the
remittance flows calculated this way overestimate the real flows. First, “compensation of
employees” represents gross earnings of migrant workers that are partly spent in the host
country and never remitted. Second, “compensation of employees” includes income of
non-migrants, e.g. local (home country) staff of foreign embassies and consulates, and
international organisations, which are treated as extraterritorial entities. Third, “other
current transfers of other sectors” include transfers that are difficult to distinguish from
workers’ remittances, e.g. aid, gifts, payments from unfounded pension plans from non-
governmental organisations (NGO), and even transfers from illicit activities. On the other
hand, the same remittance flows can be seen as underestimated because they do not
include transfers through informal channels, such as hand-carries by friends or family
members, or in-kind remittances of jewellery, clothes and other consumer goods, or
through hawala.3 These are believed to be significant in many countries, ranging from 10 to
50% of total remittances, but often are not recorded in the official statistics (Puri and
Ritzema, 1999; El-Qorchi, Maimbo and Wilson, 2002). If and when they are recorded, it is not
clear to what extent they reflect actual transfers rather than imports. For example, in recent
years, India has started recording as imports the gold brought by incoming international
passengers, although previously this was classified as remittances (Ratha, 2003).
Trends in migrant remittances to developing countries
Remittances to developing countries from international migrants rose in 2002 by
17.3%, reaching USD 149.4 billion. Compared to other capital flows, migrants’ remittances
were smaller than foreign direct investment (FDI) (83.7%), but significantly larger than
portfolio investment flows, by more then eight times, and three times larger than official
development assistance (ODA) (Chart III.1).
Remittances are a very important capital source for developing countries. In 2002, they
were equivalent to 2.4% of the cumulated GDP of developing countries, 8.2% of the
cumulated exports and 10.4% of the cumulated investments. Relative to macroeconomic
indicators, remittances are significantly higher in low-income and lower-middle income
countries than in the other developing countries. For example, remittances were equivalentINTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI 2006 EDITION – ISBN 92-64-03627-X – © OECD 2006 141
III. INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT REMITTANCES AND THEIR ROLE IN DEVELOPMENTto 216% of exports from the West Bank and Gaza, 90% of exports from Cap Verde, over 75% of
exports from Albania and Uganda, and over 50% of exports from Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Sudan and Jordan. Remittances were also equivalent to more then 40% of the GDP in Tonga,
more then 35% of the GDP in the West Bank and Gaza, more then 25% of the GDP in Lesotho,
and more then 20% of the GDP in Cap Verde, Jordan and Moldova (Table III.1).
Chart III.1. Migrants’ remittances and other capital flows to developing countries, 
1988-2002
Billions of US dollars
Note: “Remittances” refer to the sum of the “compensation of employees”, “worker’s remittances” and “other current
transfers in other sectors”; “Official flows” include general government transfers both current and capital.















Table III.1. Top 30 developing countries with the highest remittances received 
as a percentage of GDP, 2002
Note: “Remittances” refer to the sum of the “compensation of employees”, “worker’s remittances”, and “other current
transfers in other sectors”.
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 2003; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003.
Statlink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1786/614135851320
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 Remittances
as % of GDP
Tonga 41.9 Albania 15.6 Uganda 9.2
West Bank and Gaza 36.7 FYROM 15.2 Guatemala 8.9
Lesotho 25.8 Nicaragua 14.6 Pakistan 8.9
Jordan 24.0 El Salvador 14.5 Morocco 8.8
Cape Verde 23.3 Republic of Yemen 12.5 Georgia 8.3
Moldova 22.8 Dominican Republic 11.7 Sri Lanka 7.9
Vanuatu 18.4 Ghana 11.3 Latvia 7.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina 18.4 Armenia 11.2 Sudan 7.2
Guyana 18.2 Honduras 11.1 Ethiopia 6.8
Jamaica 16.7 Philippines 9.9 Bangladesh 6.6INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI 2006 EDITION – ISBN 92-64-03627-X – © OECD 2006142
III. INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT REMITTANCES AND THEIR ROLE IN DEVELOPMENTMigrant remittance flows are unequally distributed in the world, with Asia receiving
the lion’s share. Since 1996, 40 to 46% of the annual remittance flows were received by Asia,
followed by Latin America and the Caribbean with 17 to 22%, and Central and Eastern
Europe with 15 to 18% (Chart III.2). This is not surprising, since Asia is the most populous
region of the world and also has the most numerous diaspora.
It is also not surprising that the top remittance receiving countries are also the most
populous, with India and China receiving over USD 14 billion, Mexico over USD 11 billion,
the Philippines and Korea over USD 7.5 billion, and Pakistan over USD 5 billion (Table III.2).
Chart III.2. Remittance flows to developing countries by region, 1996-2002 
Percentages
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 2003. Statlink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1786/754468305471
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Table III.2. Top 30 developing countries with the highest total remittances 
received, 2002
Millions of US dollars
Note: “Total remittances” refer to the sum of the “compensation of employees”, “worker’s remittances” and “other
current transfers in other sectors”.







India 14 842 Turkey 2 990 Indonesia 1 682
China 14 383 Egypt 2 946 Ukraine 1 670
Mexico 11 464 Brazil 2 863 Romania 1 646
Philippines 7 660 Chinese Taipei 2 547 Ecuador 1 470
Korea 7 586 Dominican Republic 2 497 Croatia 1 400
Pakistan 5 413 Colombia 2 403 Thailand 1 380
Poland 3 824 Jordan 2 227 Czech Republic 1 343
Israel 3 783 Guatemala 2 081 Jamaica 1 333
Morocco 3 294 El Salvador 2 071 Rep. of Yemen 1 300
Bangladesh 3 121 Russia 1 817 Sri Lanka 1 296INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI 2006 EDITION – ISBN 92-64-03627-X – © OECD 2006 143
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received per capita: the regions that received above-average levels of remittances in 2002
were the Middle East with 305%, Latin America and the Caribbean, 210%, and eastern
Europe 165%. Asia and Africa received remittances below the 2v002 average of USD 28.53,
at proportions of respectively, 72% and 61% (Chart III.3). 
Regarding the per capita remittances received by different developing countries, the
distribution is even more unequal: Israel, Tonga, Barbados, Jamaica and Jordan received
in 2002 the highest amounts of remittances per capita (Table III.3), each exceeding by
1 500% the average per capita remittances received by developing countries.
Chart III.3. Per capita migrants’ remittances by region, 1998-2002, US dollars












1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
USD 
Africa Asia Eastern Europe Middle EastLatin America and Caribbean Average
Table III.3. Top 30 developing countries with the highest remittances 
per capita received, 2002
US dollars
Note: “Remittances” refer to the sum of the “compensation of employees”, “worker’s remittances”, and “other current
transfers in other sectors”.








Israel 583 Dominican Republic 289 Korea 159
Tonga 563 Slovenia 288 Belize 154
Barbados 512 Cyprus 280 Mauritius 139
Jamaica 510 FYROM 278 Czech Republic 132
Jordan 431 Latvia 270 Tunisia 114
West Bank and Gaza 344 Bosnia and Herzegovina 234 Mexico 114
Malta 332 Albania 229 Chinese Taipei 113
Cape Verde 321 Vanuatu 209 Ecuador 112
Croatia 320 Guatemala 174 Morocco 111
El Salvador 317 Guyana 167 Honduras 109INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI 2006 EDITION – ISBN 92-64-03627-X – © OECD 2006144
III. INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT REMITTANCES AND THEIR ROLE IN DEVELOPMENTThe International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not disaggregate remittance flow data by
source countries or by destination countries, so it is not possible to distinguish the exact
amounts of remittance outflows from remittance source countries that go to developing
countries. Nonetheless, some scholars estimated that in 2001, developing countries
received USD 18 billion in remittances from the United States alone. Another important
source of remittances for developing countries is Saudi Arabia, which is considered to be
the largest source on a per capita basis (Ratha, 2003).
2. Determinants of money remittances
The level of migrants’ remittance flows depends on both the migrants’ ability, i.e. their
income and the savings from income, and their motivation to remit savings back to the
home country. Of course, the willingness to remit is also determined by the duration of
migration (how long do migrants intend to stay abroad, temporarily or permanently?), the
family situation of migrants (single, married, with or without children?), and network
effects (do migrants move alone, with family members, and do they keep attachments to
those left behind?) (for the growing importance of network effects see Munshi, 2003). One
way of looking at the determinants of remittance flows is by analysing the motives that
migrants have to remit money. The literature distinguishes between pure altruism, pure
self-interest, informal agreements with family members left in the home country and
portfolio management decisions. As Stark (1991) points out, no general theory of
remittances exists. The studies that analyse this phenomenon provide useful descriptive
evidence and results from empirical research, but they only explain it partly, and are
characterised by certain geographical, socio-cultural and temporal limitations.
Pure altruism
One of the most intuitive motivations for remitting money back home is what has
been characterised in the literature as “altruism”: the migrants’ concern about relatives left
in the home country. Under an altruistic model, the migrant derives satisfaction from the
welfare of his/her relatives. The altruistic model advances a number of hypotheses. First,
the amount of remittances should increase with the migrant’s income. Second, the amount
of remittances should decrease with the domestic income of the family. And third,
remittances should decrease over time as the attachment to the family gradually weakens.
The same should happen when the migrant settles permanently in the host country and
family members follow. Empirical evidence from Botswana gave support to the first
prediction. A 1% increase in the migrant’s wage, ceteris paribus, induced increases in
remittances ranging from 0.25%, at low wage levels, to 0.73%, at high wage levels. However
the correlation between remittance levels and home incomes was found to be
insignificant. Thus, altruism was found to be insufficient for explaining the motivations to
remit, at least for Botswana (Lucas and Stark, 1985). Altruistic motives to remit were found
also in recent studies on United States immigrants. Households with children at home are
approximately 25% less likely to remit than households without children present. In
addition, immigrants with minors left in the country of origin are more than 50% as likely
to remit money home (Lowell and de la Garza, 2000).
Pure self-interest
Another motive for remitting money to family members in the home country may be
pure self-interest. First, a migrant may remit money to his/her parents driven by theINTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI 2006 EDITION – ISBN 92-64-03627-X – © OECD 2006 145
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the ownership of assets in the home area may motivate the migrant to remit money to
those left behind, in order to make sure that they are taking care of those assets. Empirical
evidence from Kenya and Botswana shows that wealthier parents received a larger share of
migrant earnings through remittances (Hoddinott, 1994; Lucas and Stark, 1985). However it
cannot be clearly discerned whether the motive was to inherit or to ensure the household
took care of the migrant’s assets. Survey data on Tongan and Western Samoan migrants in
Sydney attest that migrants are motivated to remit for reasons of self-interest, and in
particular for asset accumulation and investment in the home areas (Brown, 1997). Third,
the intention to return home may also promote remittances for investment in real estate,
in financial assets, in public assets to enhance prestige and political influence in the local
community, and/or in social capital (e.g. relationship with family and friends). Empirical
evidence from the Greek migration experience shows that per migrant, remittance flows
from Greek migrants in Germany were much higher (experiencing a “return illusion”) than
from Australia and the United States (experiencing a “permanent settlement syndrome”)
(Glytsos, 1988 and 1997). United States immigrants exhibit the same remittance behaviour:
each 1% increase in the time spent in the United States decreases the likelihood of
remitting by 2% and immigrants’s political lobbies in the United States are half as likely to
remit as the rest (Lowell and de la Garza, 2000). Canada, a country that receives mainly
permanent immigrants, registered a similar experience, with immigrant households
spending just a modest portion of their budgets on remittances. On average, 2 to 6 % of
their total household expenditures were devoted to this category (DeVoretz, 2004).
Implicit family agreement: co-insurance and loan
Household arrangements, particularly within an extended family, may be considered
more complex in the real world, and certainly more balanced as under the two extremes:
pure altruism and pure self-interest. Thus Lucas and Stark (1985) explained the
motivations to remit by a more eclectic model labelled “tempered altruism” and
“enlightened self-interest”. In this model, remittance determination is placed in a family
framework of decision-making, with remittances being endogenous to the migration
process. For the household as a whole, there may be a Pareto-superior strategy to allocate
certain members as migrants, and remittances should be the mechanism for redistributing
the gains. Two major sources for potential gain are taken into account: risk-spreading and
investment in the education of young family members. In this context, the intra-family
understanding is seen as an “implicit co-insurance agreement”, respectively as an “implicit
family loan agreement” (see Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002 for an empirical case study). The
implicit contract between migrant and family is safeguarded against being breached by the
family specific assets, i.e. credit and loyalty, but also by self-seeking motives of the migrant,
i.e. aspiration to inherit, investment in assets in the home area and maintenance by family,
and the intention to return home with dignity.
In the implicit co-insurance model, it is assumed that in a first phase, the migrant
plays the role of an insuree and the family left at home the role of the insurer. The family
finances the initial costs of the migration project, which in most cases are substantial. It is
expected that the potential migrant is unable to cover all the expenses alone. The high
extent of uncertainty related with the implementation of a migration intention may be
minimised by the financial support from home. In turn, the migrant can act also as an
insurer for the family members back home in a second phase of the migration process.INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI 2006 EDITION – ISBN 92-64-03627-X – © OECD 2006146
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enough earnings and has positive expectations about further income. By receiving
remittances, the family will then have the opportunity to improve its consumption, to
undertake investment projects including much more risk and thus reach a higher level of
utility. Evidence from Botswana shows that families with more cattle receive significantly
more remittances in periods of drought (Lucas and Stark, 1985).
The loan agreement model was theorised as displaying a “three waves” shape. In a
first stage, remittances are assumed to be the repayment of an informal and implicit loan
contracted by the migrant for investment in education and migration costs. In a second
stage, they are loans made by migrants to young relatives to finance their education, until
they are themselves ready to migrate. In this phase, the amounts remitted are expected to
diminish in aggregated numbers because not all migrants are expected to give a loan to
family members. Then, in the third stage, before returning to their original country,
migrants invest accumulated capital at home, therefore the amount of remittances
increases. Later, the next generation of emigrants repay the loan to the former emigrant-
lenders, who may have retired in the home country. Given the nature of the loan,
remittances cannot consequently be reduced over time – as the co-insurance or altruistic
theory predicts – and are mainly used for consumption purposes. Empirical estimations for
Botswana’s rural to urban migration showed that migrants’ years of schooling, and the
years of schooling of their own children, are positively and significantly correlated to
remittances, giving support to the loan agreement hypothesis. Empirical support was
found as well from Tonga and Western Samoa, due to the regularity of remittance flows
(Poirine, 1997). However, survey data on migrants from the these countries in Sydney
provide no evidence that in situations where parents have invested more in a migrant’s
education, they will remit more than otherwise (Brown, 1997). Recent empirical studies
also reject the loan agreement hypothesis. A 1998 marketing study of Latino households in
the United States showed that migrants’ education has a strong impact on remittances,
with each additional year of education reducing the likelihood of remitting by 7% (Lowell
and de la Garza, 2000). The results of another study with macroeconomic data from over
30 developing countries are suggesting the same behaviour of migrant workers. These
results are striking, suggesting that brain drain flows are not compensated by remittances
(Faini, 2002).
The migrant’s saving target
Another way to model remittance determination is to assume that the migrants’ goal
is to return home with a certain amount of savings – the saving target.4 Thus, remittance
flows during the migrants’ stay abroad result from a bargaining process between the
migrant and his/her family. The claim of the family left at home on the migrant’s income
is considered as the demand side and the ability of the migrant to remit, i.e. income and the
savings from income, as the supply side for remittances. The migrant has an interest in
reaching the saving target and to minimise the drains from the income (i.e. consumption
expenses in the host country and the money remitted to the family). Therefore the
expectations of future income are continuously being revised and a nexus of inter-related
factors are adjusted, including the length of stay, the intensity of work, and the flow of
remittances for the family’s consumption. On the other hand, the family is regarded as
having as its goal an income (including remittances) larger then that of the neighbours, in
order to justify the decision to send some family members abroad. Thus, the amount ofINTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI 2006 EDITION – ISBN 92-64-03627-X – © OECD 2006 147
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and the bargaining power of the two parties. Empirical evidence for the support of the
saving target hypothesis was found for Greek-German migration in the period 1960-1982,
and for migration from seven Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco,
Syria, Tunisia and Turkey), the remittances being positively correlated to the per capita
income in the host as well as in the home country (Glytsos, 1988, 2002).
In a recent paper, Lucas (2004) summarises the answers to the question whether
migration for permanent settlement results in lower remittances than temporary
migration. Temporary migrants might have higher incentives to remit to those left behind
than permanent migrants (Galor and Stark, 1990). Moreover, the longer migrants stay
abroad, the lessser are the bonds to the sending economy and the lower are the
remittances (Merkle and Zimmermann, 1992). On the other hand, migrants are better paid
the longer they live in the destination country. Thus they could (if they wish) remit more.
Lucas (2004, p. 13) concludes that remittances may initially rise, then decline with duration
of stay, which “would suggest an optimal length of stay to maximise remittance flows,
balancing greater earning power against diminishing attachment”.
Portfolio management decisions
Most of the current literature on the determinants of remittances is concentrated on
the individual motives to remit, rather than on macroeconomic variables. To be sure,
aggregate remittance flows will reflect the underlying microeconomic considerations
described above, which determine individual decisions about remittances. Nevertheless, it
is reasonable to expect that there are some macroeconomic factors, both in the host and
home country, which may significantly affect the flow of remittances. Migrants’ savings
that are not needed for personal or family consumption may be remitted for reasons of
relative profitability of savings in the home and host country, and can be explained in the
framework of a portfolio management choice. In contrast to remittances for consumption
proposes, the remittance of these kinds of savings have an exogenous character related to
the system of migration, and are expected to depend on relative macroeconomic factors in
the host and home country, i.e. interest rates, exchange rates, inflation, and relative rates
of return on different financial and real assets.
Relying on such assumptions, governments of migrant sending countries used to
implement incentives schemes, i.e. premium exchange rates, foreign exchange deposits
with higher returns, etc. in order to attract remittances from their diasporas. However,
contrary to the conventional belief, empirical analysis reveals that the incentives to attract
remittances have been not very successful. Empirical results for Turkey of the period 1963-1982
illustrate that neither variations in exchange rates (reflecting the governmental intention
to attract remittances by premium exchange rates), nor changes in the real interest rates
(reflecting the governmental intention to attract remittances by foreign exchange deposits
with higher interest rates) turned out to affect the amounts of remittance flows. The flows
of remittances towards Turkey depended more on political stability rather than economic
returns. An environment of confidence in the safety and liquidity of savings was much
more important than options of possible higher returns (Straubhaar, 1986).
According to some scholars, microeconomic factors are more significant in
determining remittance flows in the long run, while portfolio considerations are presumed
to have only a short-term effect, essentially by shifting remittances around the long-term
trend. In addition, the macroeconomic environment – especially in the home country –INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI 2006 EDITION – ISBN 92-64-03627-X – © OECD 2006148
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Therefore, this issue can become crucial for the amount of officially recorded transfers.
Inflation in the home country was found to have a negative impact on remittances,
perhaps reflecting uncertainties from the perspective of the remitters (Glytsos, 2001).
Similarly, remittances became volatile in the Philippines following the financial crisis at
the end of the 1990s, and suffered a decline as the economy slipped into crisis in 1999
and 2000 (Ratha, 2003).
It should be pointed out that these numerous hypotheses trying to explain migration
decision and remittances are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it may be the case that
remittances are driven by all of these motives at the same time, each one explaining a part
of the remittance amount or period of remitting practice. One of the elements can
predominate over the others for a period or for a sample of migrant workers, and their roles
can be later interchanged. This implies the complexity of the remittance phenomenon and
its determinants, and explains the challenges of developing a universal theory (El-Sakka
and McNabb, 1999).
3. The transfer channels
Since systematic research on the determinants of workers’ remittances was
undertaken in the 1980s, there was been a recognition that an important part of the money
remitted back home by migrant workers flows through informal channels. An unstable
macroeconomic environment in the home country was assumed to be a significant reason
for choosing informal remittance mechanisms by the migrants. However, systematic
research on transfer mechanisms has been carried out only in the last few years. Here the
focus has been on: i) the typology of the transfer mechanisms, ii) the comparative cost of
transfers through different mechanisms, and iii) the choice of the transfer means and
money transfer market evolutions.
The typology of transfer mechanisms
Migrants use a wide array of informal and formal mechanisms to remit money,
ranging from hand deliveries by the migrants themselves or by a third party, and less
regulated mechanism such as “hawala”, or “hundi”, to electronic transfers through postal
services, banks, credit unions, and money transfer companies.
Hand-carries by the migrants themselves or by a courier represent a transfer
mechanism supposed to persist only among the poorest in the developing world, such as
in Africa (Orozco, 2002). But this is not the case. Recent data for Latin America show that
almost 10% of all remittances to those countries are hand-carried (Suro et al., 2002). For the
Romanian diaspora, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that these
informal mechanisms could account even for 50% of the remittance transfers (IOM, 2004).5
Another informal mechanism reported by Suro (2003) is sending money by ordinary
mail. Even if this is a quite risky mechanism, it accounts for 7% of the remittances send by
Latino migrants in the United States.
Asian migrants use an additional informal transfer mechanism by which money is not
physically or electronically transferred. This system is known as “hawala” (meaning transfer)
in Pakistan and Bangladesh, “hundi” (meaning collect) in India, “fei ch’ien”(meaning flying
money) or “chits/chops” (meaning notes/seals) in China. As described by El-Qorchi (2002),
transfers from country A to country B through this mechanism involve two intermediaries,INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI 2006 EDITION – ISBN 92-64-03627-X – © OECD 2006 149
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person from country A to be transferred to another person in country B. The person in
country A receives a code for authentication proposes. The hawaladar then instructs his/
her correspondent in country B to pay an equivalent amount in local currency to the
designated beneficiary, who needs to disclose the code to receive the funds. Although the
remittance is immediately transferred, the liability the hawaladar in country A has to his
counterpart in county B is set through various mechanisms of compensation occurs at
different moments and often does not involve direct payment between the two
hawaladars.
There are also formal immigrant-businesses involved in international money
transfers. In the United States, these are known as “ethnic stores”, and most of them
operate transfers to Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and the Philippines. As Orozco (2002)
reports, these enterprises need to contend with competition from the hawala system
(which operates outside the US regulation system). They also face tough competition from
wire transfer services, such as Western Union, which have more market power. According
to recent estimates, this type of business is gradually losing global market share, from 50%
in 1996 to 45% in 2001 (Orozco, 2002).
Postal offices also entered the international remittance market in the 1990s, by
offering the possibility of transfers through international money orders. EuroGiro, a
European company established in 1993, operates in direct co-operation with the Universal
Postal Union (UPU) to promote new solutions for postal financial organisations worldwide.
Currently, it operates international money transfers in more than 30 countries including
the European Union (EU), Canada, United States, most Central and Eastern European
countries, Brazil, China and Israel. The US Post Office has its own transfer system that
allows transfers to most Latin American countries. Additionally, they introduced in 1998
Dinero Seguro@, a system that offers the possibility of transferring smaller amounts of
money (up to USD 2 000) from postal offices in the United States to any of the 2 300 Bancomer
branches in Mexico.
The most popular businesses for international money transfers are the money
transfer companies, like Western Union and Money Gram. Money transfer companies are
non-bank financial institutions which are authorised to engage in banking activities not
involving the receipt of money on any current account subject to withdrawals by check
(Lowell and de la Garza, 2000). The company with the largest global presence is Western
Union. It has more than 170 000 agent locations worldwide and a global market share of
about 26% (Orozco, 2002).
The transfer mechanisms developed by banks and credit unions have the particularity
that at least the remittance sender must open a current account with a bank in the host
country. Having a current account with a bank allows the remittance sender to
electronically send money to a bank account of the receiver in the home country. Moreover
modern banking technology permits payments in stores or cash withdrawals at Automated
Teller Machines (ATMs) with a debit or credit card at the receiving end. The amounts paid/
withdrawn this way are then credited on the account of the remittance sender. According
to the Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation National Survey of Latinos, major
barriers for Latino migrants in the United States wanting to use this mechanism are legal
status (which impedes illegal migrants from opening current accounts), lack of information
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transfer mechanisms in the United States is that current account holders have to choose
between the size of the minimum balance they maintain in the account and the fees they
pay for running the current account (i.e. fees decrease as the minimum balance decreases).
Maintaining a minimum balance of at least USD 1 000, that eliminates fees, is beyond the
abilities of many Latino migrants “who earn low wages, live payday to payday, and dispatch
most of their disposable income in remittances” (Suro et al., 2003). For remittance transfers
to Latin America, banks and credit unions have a market share of 13% (Suro, 2003).
The comparative cost of transfers through different mechanisms
The cost of transferring money varies greatly from country to country, and according
to the method of transfer. But migrants are not interested only in transfer costs. They are
also interested in the risk they carry. The cheapest transfer methods are self hand-carries
and ordinary post, but they involve also the highest risk of being stolen.
The hawala system is par excellence a system of trust. It is very popular because it is
relatively inexpensive (1.25 to 2% of the transferred value), senders do not have to provide
identification, and it is well organised in the migrants’ home countries.
More formal transfer mechanisms reduce significantly the transfer risks, but are also
much more costly compared to informal ones. For example, the Inter American
Development Bank estimated that the total cost of sending remittances to Latin America
and the Caribbean reached USD 4 billion in 2002. That is about 12.5% of the total
remittances. Because of the small amounts per transaction (about USD 200), the fees are
very high. Orozco (2003) provided a good comparison of the cost involved in formal
international money transfers for the sending of small amounts of money (USD 200). He
compared the cost of remittance transfers from six sending countries (France, Germany,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States) to 14 receiving countries in
southern Europe, South Asia, Africa and Latin America. The study includes banks, national
money transfer companies (“ethnic stores”), and international money transfer companies.
The mean value to send USD 200 was 6% through “ethnic stores”, 7% through banks
and 12% through money transfer companies like Thomas Cook or Western Union.
Competition is very important for reducing remittance costs. But in many cases, it is
inhibited because of the lack of banking services in the rural populations of sending
countries, a lack of confidence in formal channels, impediments to banking because of
legal status (i.e. illegal residence) and lack of information about modern banking methods
for money remittances.
The choice of the transfer means and money transfer market evolution
In order to better understand how remitters choose the means to send money home,
the Pew Hispanic Center and the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American
Development Bank commissioned Bendixen and Associates, a public opinion research
company based in Miami that specialises in polling Latinos in the United States, to conduct
an intensive study. Extensive interviews with 302 remittance senders were conducted,
focused on their understanding of the costs involved and their willingness to use new
methods, such as the electronic transfer products that US banks are now putting on the
market. The results are presented in the report “Billions in Motion: Latino Immigrants,
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remitters from the United States to Latin America – use international money transfer
companies such as Western Union and MoneyGram, which are expensive relative to banks
and credit unions.
The results of the study indicate that a large segment of the remitting population is
willing, even eager, to explore new methods of sending money home. But a variety of legal
and institutional factors impede their ability to do so. Many lack proper identity documents
and fear that the failure to produce valid papers at a bank will jeopardise their possibility
to stay in the country. They are receptive to innovations that help overcome legal
impediments to banking, such as the identity cards issued by Mexican consulates in the
United States known as the “matricula”. Yet, despite all the recent developments that have
helped formalise and ease remittance flows, for many Latinos it remains an expensive and
confusing process, primarily because of minimum balance requirements and the fees
charged. These factors all mean that remitters keep going back to the old methods, mainly
international money transfer companies, even though they are concerned that they are
paying excessive transaction fees and foreign exchange costs.
These findings suggest that a wholesale move by remitters to banking channels will
only take place if banks can offer similar services to those provided by international money
transfer companies, at significantly reduced costs. This will involve more than simply
putting an effective product on the market and letting it go head-to-head with existing
products. Banks will need to guarantee competitive pricing and quality of service at both
ends of the remittance transaction. Given the intimate family connections between
remittance senders and receivers, the convenience, reliability and safety of the services
provided in Latin America will have to meet or exceed those currently available there.
If immigrants who regularly dispatch most of their disposable income in remittances
could acquire the habit of accumulating money in a bank account, they would attain benefits
that go beyond economising on the costs of remittance. The potential benefits include
reduced banking costs, interest-paying savings accounts, the responsible use of credit, and
ultimately financial practices that are rewarded by the tax system, such as home ownership
and retirement savings accounts. In order to attract new customers, some US banks already
offer financial literacy training and help Mexican immigrants to obtain “matriculas”.
Moreover, as other authors argue, ensuring transparency in pricing and greater
consumer awareness about the available options are also important for a fair competition
Table III.4. Cost of remittance sending
Percentage
Source: Orozco (2003). Statlink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1786/816701010268
From the six sending countries to: Bank Ethnic store/exchange house International money transfer company
Egypt 13.8
Philippines 8.0 10.1 10.3
India 6.0 2.5 13.8
Greece 6.8 9.5




Mean 7.0 6.0 12.0INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI 2006 EDITION – ISBN 92-64-03627-X – © OECD 2006152
III. INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT REMITTANCES AND THEIR ROLE IN DEVELOPMENTand efficient market for remittance transfers. This is one of the reasons for the
introduction by the United States of the Wire Transfer Fairness and Disclosure Act.
According to this act, fees and exchange rates have to be posted in the offices of money
transfer agencies and in their advertising, and remitters are to be provided with a receipt
stating the exact amount of foreign currency to be received in the foreign country (Suro
et al., 2002).
4. The economic effects of money remittances
There is a bulk of economic literature on the impact of money remittances on the
remittance receiving countries (a very recent study is Terry et al., 2004). Most of the analysis
has tended to focus on three main issues. The first part of the literature discusses the
direct impact of remittances on income distribution, poverty alleviation and individual
welfare. The second part concentrates on the subsequent effects of remittances on the
economy as a whole, discussing the impact on employment, productivity and growth. And
finally, the third part deals with the contribution of remittances to cover deficits in the
trade balance and in the current account.
Remittances and income distribution
The research on the income distribution effects of remittances focuses on social
justice and equality, and does not deal with implications for the home economy. In
empirical evaluations, most of the studies on income distribution effects of remittances
use the Gini index. The empirical evidence is mixed. Some scholars such as Ahlburg (1996),
Taylor and Wyatt (1996) and Taylor (1999) found confirmation for the hypothesis that
remittances had an equalising effect on income distribution in Tonga and Mexico. For
Tongan households, for example, the Gini coefficient for total income declined from 0.37 to
0.34 with the receipt of remittances. By contrast, other studies show that remittances
increase inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. One of the main reasons for this is
that richer families are more able to pay for the costs associated with international
migration. Thus, evidence from Egypt shows that despite the poverty reduction (because a
significant number of poor households do receive remittances), remittances induced
income inequality to rise (Adams, 1991). In the Philippines, remittances contributed in
the 1980s to a 7.5% rise in rural income inequality, in spite of a low share of remittances in
the households’ income (Rodriguez, 1998). Household survey data from Pakistan reveal
that the wealthier income groups were those which benefited the most from migrants’
remittances (Adams, 1998).
Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986, 1988) used a dynamic model to offer a broader view
on the income distribution effect of remittances. Focusing on rural income distribution in
two Mexican villages, they found that the income distribution effect of remittances
depends decisively on the migration history, and on the degree to which migration
opportunities are diffused across households. They suggested that the dynamics of
migration and income distribution might be represented by an inverse U-shape
relationship. At the early stages of migration history information about target destinations
and employment possibilities in destination countries is still limited. At this stage, it is
mainly wealthier households that send migrants abroad. Consequently, the wealthier
families benefit first from migrant remittances, causing income inequality to rise. At later
phases of migration history, as migration is widely spread over a greater range of incomeINTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK: SOPEMI 2006 EDITION – ISBN 92-64-03627-X – © OECD 2006 153
III. INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT REMITTANCES AND THEIR ROLE IN DEVELOPMENTclasses, poorer households benefit from migrant remittances as well and remittances have
an equalising effect on income distribution.
But evidence derived from dynamic models is also divergent. Using a similar approach
to that of Strak, Taylor and Yitzhaki, and inter-temporal data from the 1973, 1978 and 1983
Yugoslavian household surveys, Milanovic (1987) found no support for the U-shape
relationship hypothesis. In contrast, his results showed that remittances lead to income
divergence. Furthermore, the effects differ according to the periods and social categories
considered.
There is no decisive conclusion as to whether migrant remittances induce income
convergence or divergence at origin, for two main reasons. First, there is diversity in the
environments studied in terms of initial inequality. And second, disparities in results may
be caused by differences in the empirical methods applied: static versus dynamic, with or
without endogenous migration costs, and with or without factoring in the effects of
migration on domestic income sources (Docquier and Rapoport, 2003). This theoretical
study suggests that the conflicting results of the empirical literature may be reconciled if
local wage changes at origin are taken into account. They show that the inequality impact
of remittances and local wage adjustment tend to reinforce one another in the case of high
initial inequality, but may compensate one another in the low initial inequality case. This
has important implications for empirical studies. For example, in the Mexican case, where
inequality is high, the omission of wage adjustments may lead to an underestimation of
the equalising effect of remittances. On the contrary, in the Yugoslavian case, where
inequality is lower, taking this labour market effect into account could possibly reverse an
inequality enhancing effect. However, this theoretical finding has to be considered with
care, until confirmed by empirical work (Adams and Page, 2003).
Remittances and growth
There are some indisputable welfare effects of migrant remittances. First, remittances
are an important source of income for many low and middle-income households in
developing countries. Second, remittances provide the hard currency needed for importing
scarce inputs that are not available domestically and also additional savings for economic
development (Ratha, 2003; Taylor, 1999; Quibria, 1997). But the magnitude of the
development impact of remittances on the receiving countries was assumed by many
scholars to depend on how this money was spent. Thus, a significant proportion of the
literature studies the use of remittances for consumption, housing, purchasing of land,
financial saving and productive investment. There is no doubt that spending on
entrepreneurial investment has a positive direct effect on employment and growth.6
However, other scholars documented that even the disposition of remittances on
consumption and real estate may produce various indirect growth effects on the economy.
These include the release of other resources to investment and the generation of multiplier
effects. Regarding the use of migrant remittances, a longstanding literature has suggested
that remittances are more often spent on basic consumption needs, health care and real
estate. But, whether from remittances or other sources, income is spent in a way which
responds to the hierarchy of needs. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that until the
developing countries reach a certain level of welfare, households will continue to exhibit
the same spending pattern (Lowell and de la Garza, 2000).
A more significant aspect concerning the use of remittances questions whether they
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receiving remittances. Yet other scholars suggest that remittances are treated differently
than other sources of income and are more often saved. Household surveys in Pakistan
show that a larger part of international remittances are saved (71%) compared to domestic
urban-rural remittances (49%) and rental income (8.5%) (Adams, 1998). In other countries,
for example Mali, remittances are used to build schools and clinics (Martin and Weil, 2002).
But the decisions of remittance senders (or receivers) to invest more or less is a rational
choice about the use of their income, according to the general economic situation in their
countries. Household productive investments do not depend on income, but rather on
interest rates, stock prices, sound macroeconomic policies and stable economic growth
(Puri and Ritzema, 1999).
Recent economic research shows that remittances, even when not invested, can have
an important multiplier effect. One remittance dollar spent on basic needs will stimulate
retail sales, which stimulates further demand for goods and services, which then
stimulates output and employment (Lowell and de la Garza, 2000).
Most of the theoretical researches considering the multiplier effects of remittances
use models that capture both migration and remittances effects on welfare. They consider
remittances as a possible offset to the decline in output suffered by developing countries,
caused by the loss of trade opportunities as a result of emigration. The results show that if
low-skilled migrants emigrate, the welfare of the source country rises in the case that
remittances are in excess of the domestic income loss. If highly-skilled persons emigrate
and/or if emigration is accompanied by capital, remittances have a welfare increasing
effect for the non-migrants only when the capital/labour ratio of the source economy
remains unchanged or rises. If the capital/labour ratio falls, the welfare effect is
indeterminate or even negative (Quibria, 1997). For example, for the Central and Eastern
European countries, Straubhaar and Wolburg (1999) found that remittances do not
compensate the welfare loss due to the emigration of the high skilled to Germany.
However, when foreign capital is present in an economy, remittance financed capital
accumulation improves the welfare of the economy. If remittances are spent for
consumption, the welfare impact of remittances depends on the relative factor intensities
of traded and non-traded goods (Djajic, 1998).
The empirical evidence indicates that multiplier effects can substantially increase
gross national product. Thus for example every “migradollar” spend in Mexico induced a
GNP increase of USD 2.69 for the remittances received by urban households and USD 3.17
for the remittances received by rural households (Ratha, 2003). In Greece, remittances
generated at the beginning of the 1970s a multiplier of 1.77 in gross output, accounting for
more than half of the GDP growth rate. Furthermore, high proportions of employment were
supported by remittances: 10.3% in mining, 5.2% in manufacturing and 4.7% in
construction. And the capital generated by remittances amounts to 8% of the installed
capacity in manufacturing. Of particular interest is the finding that spending on
consumption and investment produced similar multipliers of respectively 1.8 and 1.9. And
contrary to common opinion, expenditure on housing was found to be very productive,
with a multiplier of 2 (Glytsos, 1993). By carrying out an econometric test on data from
11 Central and Eastern European countries, Léon-Ledesma and Piracha (2001) found that
remittances significantly contribute to the increase of the investment level of the source
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unemployment, but insignificantly.
Remittances do not only have positive effects on the source economy. If remittances
generate demand greater than the economy’s capacity to meet this demand, and this
demand falls on non-tradable goods, remittances can have an inflationary effect. In Egypt,
for example, the price for agricultural land rose between 1980 and 1986 by 600% due to
remittances (Adams, 1991). Along with the positive effects remittances had on Jordan’s
economy, in the years 1985, 1989 and 1990, they seem to have intensified recession very
strongly and generated negative growth rates of over 10%. Other potential negative welfare
implications of remittances are the encouragement of continued migration of the working-
age population and the dependence among recipients accustomed to the availability of
these funds. All these could perpetuate an economic dependency that undermines the
prospects for development (Buch et al., 2002).
Finally, because remittances take place under asymmetric information and economic
uncertainty, it could be that there exists a significant moral hazard problem leading to a
negative effect of remittances on economic growth. Given the income effect of remittances,
people could afford to work less and to diminish labour supply. Using panel methods on a
large sample of countries Chami et al. (2003) found that remittances have a negative effect
on economic growth (which according to the authors indicates that the moral hazard
problem in remittances is severe).
Balance of payments effects of remittances
The impact of remittances on private consumption, saving and investments is only
part of the story about the contribution of remittances to the growth and development of
source countries. Remittances are an addition not only to the domestic household income
but also to the receipt side of the balance of payments.
Remittances offset chronic balance of payments deficits, by reducing the shortage of
foreign exchange. These transfers can help to ease the often crucial restraint imposed on
the economic development of the migrants’ home countries by balance of payments
deficits. They have a more positive impact on the balance of payments than other
monetary inflows (such as financial aid, direct investment or loans), because their use is
not tied to particular investment projects with high import content, bear no interest and do
not have to be repaid. In addition, remittances are a much more stable source of foreign
exchange than other private capital flows and for certain countries they exhibit an anti-cyclical
character (Buch et al., 2002; Buch and Kuckulenz, 2004; Nayyar, 1994; Straubhaar, 1988).
Developing countries quickly recognised this obvious and clearly estimable positive
balance of payments effect of remittances, and measures were taken to increase such
inflows of foreign exchange. But such measures must be implemented with care, because
apart from the positive balance of payments effects, remittances have an impact on the
economic activity in the home country. Depending on how they are spent or invested, their
effects on production, inflation and imports will be different.
A crucial factor in this respect is the extent to which the additional demand induced
by remittances can be met by expanding domestic output. The flexibility with which
domestic supply reacts to extra demand will determine whether remittances will have
positive employment effects or adverse inflation effects, and whether additional imports
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effect”. This occurs when remittances induce an increase of imports and trade balance
deficits in the remittance-receiving country. However, most scholars disagree that it is the
remittance-induced imports that cause these trade balance problems. The propensity to
import can also increase as a consequence of the general development of the economy, of
a structural change in the production of consumer or investment goods, or of the
international division of labour. Neither is the “boomerang effect” supported by empirical
research. Evidence shows that in south European countries, remittance-induced imports
between 1960 and 1981 accounted for minimums of 1% in Spain and Italy, to maximums of
4.9% in Greece and 6.2% in Portugal (Glytsos, 1993; Straubhaar, 1988).
Another negative effect can be produced where remittances generate demand greater
than the economy’s capacity to produce. When this demand falls on tradable goods,
remittances can induce an appreciation of the real exchange rate. The overvalued
exchange rate reduces the competitiveness of the domestic industries in the foreign
markets (by expensive exports), in the home markets (by cheap imports), and shifts
resources from the tradable sector into the non-tradable sector, so-called Dutch Disease
effect. This may further lead to balance of payments pressure, a slower growth of
employment opportunities, and consequently to a further increase in the incentive to
emigrate. Empirical evidence from Egypt, Portugal and Turkey supports such fears, but the
effect remained marginal in most of the observed cases and periods (McCormick and
Wahba, 2004; Straubhaar, 1988). A possible reason for an insignificant Dutch disease effect
of remittances is that the additional import of cheap capital goods may increase
productivity and therefore improve the competitiveness of domestic products. Moreover,
the imported capital goods may be used to substitute other imports and/or to produce
exportable goods.
Further, in a system based on non-convertible domestic currency, the privilege of
holding foreign currency in corroboration with inflationary tensions may have adverse
consequences in monetary terms. For example, in the countries of the Maghreb, the
development of a black market for foreign exchange, the increased use of swap
transactions in the foreign and domestic trade, and the very high prices for foreign goods
lead in the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s to a situation in which foreign exchange was
used for the domestic exchange for luxuries, or to buy services in order to obtain them
more rapidly. Under such circumstances of currency substitution (known in the literature
as “dollarisation” or “euroisation”), the authorities of countries with a non-convertible
domestic currency used to devaluate the national currency periodically in order to attract
remittances from emigrants. For example, Algeria started to devaluate the dinar after 1985
and consequently its value dropped from 5 dinars a dollar in 1985 to 9 dinars a dollar
in 1990, and 20 dinars a dollar in 1992 (Garson, 1994).
Conclusion
On the basis of this survey on the complex phenomenon of international migrant
remittances, the following conclusions can be drawn.
International migrant remittances are a very important source of capital for
developing countries. They are less important than FDI, but surpass by far official
development assistance and capital market flows. Moreover, remittances are a very stable
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evidence of an anti-cyclical character.
Many central banks face difficulties in implementing the distinctive booking of
international migrant remittances as income (compensation of employees), current
transfers (workers’ remittances) and capital transfers (migrants’ transfers), according to
IMF definitions. The main problem that occurs is that many central banks in developing
countries have difficulties in distinguishing “workers’ remittances” from the other private
transfers. Therefore they book entire or important parts of workers remittance flows under
“other current transfers of other sectors”. This often means that the level of official
remittance flows to developing countries is undervalued, and creates difficulties for any
international comparison of remittance data. The best way to overcome this data problem
is by evaluating formal remittance flows as the sum of the following three balance of
payments components: compensation of employees, workers’ remittances, and other
transfers of other sectors.
The different hypotheses attempting to explain remittance motivations – pure
altruism, pure self-interest, implicit family agreements, the migrant’s saving target and
portfolio management decisions – complement each other. Some or all of these motives
together may simultaneously drive remittances, each one explaining a part of the amount
remitted or a period of remitting practice. One motive can predominate over the other for
a period or for a sample of migrants with the same characteristics, and their roles can be
interchanged. This illustrates that the remittance phenomenon is a very complex one, and
explains the difficulty in developing a universal theory of remittance determination. A very
important recent assumption regarding the contribution of remittances in compensating
the human capital loss of migrant sending countries is that migrants’ propensity to remit
diminishes with education. There is little empirical work regarding this issue (an exception
is Faini, 2002), but if confirmed by future research, the results would be outstanding. It
would imply that high skilled workers do not compensate (or compensate less) for the loss
they induce to the economy they are leaving.
A significant part of the money remitted by international migrants goes to the transfer
companies as profits rather than to the migrants’ families in developing countries.
Empirical studies show that a reduction of the costs of remitting money to the level
charged by the financial institutions with the cheapest transfer services, i.e. commercial
banks, would free up several billions each year for poor households in Africa, Asia, Latin
America and eastern Europe. This can be achieved by two sets of policies in industrial,
remittance-sending countries. First, policies that target fair competition and efficient
markets for remittance transfers, e.g. ensuring transparency in pricing and greater
consumer awareness about the available options. Second, innovations that allow illegal
migrants to open bank accounts (such as the “matriculas” in the United States) and thus
give access to cheaper transfer services. By assuring lower cost for remittance sending,
larger remittance flows could be channelled through the formal financial system too.
In addition to direct impacts of remittances on migrant sending economies,
i.e. poverty reduction, offset of balance of payments deficits, reducing of foreign exchange
shortages, productive investments, etc., remittances also have positive indirect effects.
These are the easing of capital and risk constraints, the release of other resources for
investment and the generation of multiplier effects of consumption spending. Despite this,
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the developmental impact of remittances in migrant sending areas. Productive investment
does not depend on income, but rather on market infrastructure, interest rates, stock
prices, macroeconomic policies and stable economic growth. Following models of sound
macroeconomic management and development strategies involving the whole economy
will be the best means to maximise the positive growth effects of remittances in
developing countries.
Notes
1. The paper has been written by Thomas Straubhaar and Florin P. Vădean, Hamburg Institute of
International Economics (HWWA). It is a result of the Hamburg Institute of International Economics
(HWWA) Migration Research Group. Valuable comments from Christina Boswell, Michael Bräuniger,
Jean-Pierre Garson, Dragoş Radu, and Nadia Vădean are gratefully acknowledged. Financial
support from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) are noted with appreciation.
2. “Other current transfers of other sectors” (item code 2392) together with “workers’ remittances”
(item code 2391) are the two subcomponents of “current transfers, other sectors” (item code 2390).
“Other sectors” refer to other non-government sectors.
3. For more about hawala (meaning transfer), see below under “The transfer channels”.
4. In the model, the savings target is excluded from the remittance flows.
5. As far as is known, almost all East European bus transport companies that link the East European
countries to the EU also offer courier services. Because of the low cost, mainly poor and unskilled
workers use them both for travelling and sending remittances.
6. Remarkably, spending on education is generally categorised in the literature as consumption, in
spite of the fact that scholars regard education as one of the main determinants of economic
growth.
7. One extra drachma of remittances generated 1.7 drachma of gross output. 
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